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The Federal Sentencing Reporter has provided an
important service by publishing this symposium,
Gender and Sentencing. I am honored to participate
by offering a few introductory comments.
A thoughtful group of commentators tum our
attention to the distinctive issues facing women who
are defendants in the federal criminal justice system.
While many may aspire to a legal system in which
gender has no relevance, we live in a world in which
gender, race, and ethnicity structure so many aspects
of our lives that one cannot but ask: What, if any, are
the effects of gender on women who are defendants
and/or incarcerated under federal law?
The question is both asked and answered in this
series of essays, which explore problems from
sentencing to incarceration and probation. Professor
Kathleen Daly provides an overview; in her aptly
titled essay, "Gender and Sentencing: What We Know
and Don't Know From Empirical Research," she reviews
the literature (including data from her own studies)
and discusses the difficulties of comparing women
and men. Because gender is reflected in occupational
status, role in offenses, and a host of other variables,
it is difficult to determine what, if any, effects gender
has, qua gender. As she puts it, "[m]ost sentencing
criteria are, in fact, gender-linked." The federal
sentencing guidelines do not assume women are the
"presumptive subjects" of sentencing; instead the
prevailing assumption is that men are defendants.
Norms of so-called "neutrality" are not in practice
neutral because women and men are not currently
similarly situated outside the criminal justice system.
Daly finds that, while women and men are treated
similarly in some respects, women and men with
obligations of care for others ("familied women" and
"familied men") are not treated similarly.
That theme-of women defendants involved
with their families and responsible for providing care
-is central to several of the essays. Judge Patricia M.
Wald of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit asks: "What About the
Kids?": Parenting Issues in Sentencing. For Judge
Wald, the critical facts are that about "80% of the
7,000 incarcerated federal women prisoners have
young children; almost 70% of those children lived
with their mothers before conviction; two-thirds of
the women are single parents." The Sentencing
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Commission has, however, issued the rule that
"[fjamily ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a sentence should be
outside the applicable guideline range." Judge Wald
believes that judicial inquiry into what constitutes
"ordinary" and "extraordinary" family circumstances
is a misguided enterprise; instead, the fact of being a
caregiving parent should be directly relevant to
sentencing.! As she puts it: "Neither Congress nor the
Sentencing Commission has yet come forth with a
convincing rationale why parenting should not be a
legitimate consideration in the sentencing of low-risk
offenders."
District Judge Julian Abele Cook, Jr., Chief Judge
of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, shares Judge Wald and Professor
Daly's concerns, that "the professed 'neutrality'
makes certain women's issues---especially family
responsibility and dependent relationships-virtually
invisible." To illustrate his views, he provides a
detailed discussion of a particular case of a married
couple charged with involvement in a drug
conspiracy; as he describes, federal sentencing
guidelines "strongly discourage" federal judges from
considering a defendant's pregnancy, her family
responsibility, or her spouse's acceptance of greater
responsibility for an offense. Judge Cook calls for his
colleagues on the bench to respond to the need to
"administer justice" by pressing for changes in the
guidelines to permit consideration of family roles and
obligations.
Both Judges Wald and Cook invoke the work of
Professor Myrna S. Raeder, author of a detailed study
on gender and sentencing,2 who writes here about
nonviolent women offenders as "forgotten" by federal
"reforms" based on a "punitive pro-prison model for
sentencing males who are assumed to be violent and/
or major drug dealers." According to Professor
Raeder, more women are incarcerated under the
guidelines and for longer terms than before the
guidelines were established. She then turns to
analyze case law on departures provided for single
mothers and pregnant offenders, and finds "continu-
ing hostility to family based departures" in some
circuits. After considering this case law and judicial
responses to claims of battering, coercion, dominance
and abuse made by women defendants, Professor
Raeder calls for a "Federal Task Force," akin to that
created in Canada, to consider sentencing policies
designed with women in mind.
Mary-Christine Sungaila shares Professor
Raeder's concerns about how "gender-based circum-
stances," such as coercive treatment of women by
men, are dealt with in federal sentencing law. More
optimistic about the current state of the law on this
issue, Attorney Sungaila believes that while "the
guidelines make no express accommodation for
women offenders, they do allow sentencing courts to
take into account mitigating circumstances dispropor-
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tionately experienced by women offenders because of
their sex." For her, defense counsel has a critical role
to play in making presentations to courts to enable
them to respond appropriately to problems presented
by female defendants.
Commission staff members Phyllis J. Newton, Jill
Glazer, and Kevin Blackwell share Sungaila's view of
the need to attend to women. Newton, Glazer, and
Blackwell make several suggestions for how the
guidelines might, consistent with Commission policy,
be altered to take into account the concerns about
women that have now been raised. First, given that
the Commission's enabling legislation urges "non-
imprisonment alternatives for appropriate first-time
non-violent offenders," both women and men may
have options; the Commission itself is "re-examining
its approach to alternatives to imprisonment."
Second, the Commission is also considering whether
downward departures are appropriately based on
offender characteristics, such as parenting. Third, the
Commission is reviewing implementation of its
guidelines to assess whether "inadvertent gender
effects"-such as the imposition of greater hardships
on women than men prisoners by placement of
women at greater distance from their families-are
occurring.
That issue-incarceration and its alternatives-is
the focus of essays by Maria Rodrigues McBride,
Chief United States Probation Officer for the District
of Connecticut, and by Anupam Chander, a lawyer.
According to McBride, to the extent either prosecutors
or judges treat women any more leniently than they
do men, it is in an effort to deal "fairly and realisti-
cally with a minority female population within a
woefully inadequate system designed for male
offenders." She reviews the small number of prisons
for women, the limited implementation of prison
classification systems, and the distance of incarcerated
women from their families. Calling for equal treat-
ment, she hopes that instead of women being treated
as "harshly" as men, the efforts made to respond to
inadequacies for women will be used as the model for
the treatment of men. Anupam Chander offers one
kind of practical implementation of this suggestion:
that federal judges have the authority "to designate
the place of confinement if the defendant is sentenced
to probation." Chander reviews the legislative and
judicial authority in support of this proposition, in the
hopes that both women and men will benefit from it.
A fitting conclusion to this introduction is to turn
readers' attention to the essay by Judge John C.
Coughenour, who chaired the Ninth Circuit Gender
Bias Task Force/ and who considers both the sentenc-
ing of women and the conditions of their confinement
in the federal system. Judge Coughenour examines
the hardships imposed on women in prison, ranging
from their distance from their homes, families, and
lawyers, to limited medical facilities, often not
responsive to women's health needs, and inappropri-
ate treatment (including the occasional shackling of
pregnant defendants). Judge Coughenour offers a
series of practical responses, including contracting
with local officials to provide a wider set of facilities
for women prisoners, alteration of sentencing
guidelines, and judicial efforts to provide relevant
information to the Bureau of Prisons.
As Judge Coughenour puts it, "much remains to
be done." A central problem is the lack of informa-
tion about women in the federal criminal system.
The Ninth Circuit's Task Force on Gender found that
no information was kept centrally to identify where
all women defendants and prisoners are housed or to
detail their conditions of confinement.4 Further, the
Task Force's efforts to understand the distinct
experiences of women of all colors, races, and
ethnicities within the federal criminal justice system
was similarly limited by an absence of attention and
data.s Systematic data about women and sentencing
were also lacking; case law reports provide snapshots
but do not give the whole picture, and Commission
data do not consider all the variables one would want
to take into account.
But, as the essays that follow ably demonstrate,
we know enough to be worried about the effects of
governing principles on women in the federal
criminal justice system. While some of the commen-
tators are more positive than others about the options
for women available under current law, all agree that
more attention needs to be paid to the specific
problems faced by women defendants.
I should add that attention needs to be paid to
women both as members of families (either giving
care or upon occasion subjected to abuse) and as
women outside of families who are neither identified
by their familiar role nor always in positions tradi-
tionally associated with females. 6 Women are not a
singular set, but differ on many dimensions, includ-
ing those of race, class, sexual orientation, age,
parental status, occupational position, and the like.
Women share the ways in which the social order is
organized by gender, but that organization is varied
and complex; reforms must themselves be predicated
on a nuanced appreciation of the diverse situations of
women and speak to this range of concerns.
We know that gender matters, in and outside of
prison, in and outside of families, in and outside of
courts. Law cannot wish away inequalities of treat-
ment but must instead explore what substantive
equality entails and then how to achieve it in practice.
NOTES
I Compare the discussion in United States v. Dyce, No.
94-3171 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 8, 1996), reprinted infra, 8 Fed. Sent.
R. 183 (1995) (reversing a district court's reduction of a
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woman's sentence based on family responsibilities;
characterizing the care of two young children, nursing of a
child, and a third expected as not "extraordinary" and
finding no other basis for a downward departure).
2 Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms,
Battered Women and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender
Free World of the Sentencing Guidelines, 20 Pepp. 1. Rev. 905
(1993).
3 The Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, The Effects
ofGender: The Final Report of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force, 67 S. Cal. 1. Rev. 745 (1994).
4 The Ninth Circuit, The Effects of Gender, supra note 3, at
916.
5 Id. at 918.
6 See Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women,
Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. 1. Rev. 1682
(1991).
